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London	Calling	Brexit:	The	City	of	London	and	the
‘baptist-bootlegger’	coalition
Think	of	London	and	Brexit	and	most	will	think	of	what	it	means	for	‘the	City’,	the	heart	of
the	UK’s	financial	services	industry.	In	this,	the	second	in	our	London	Calling	Brexit
series,	Scott	James	(King’s	College	London)	and	Lucia	Quaglia	(University	of	Bologna)
examine	why	London’s	financial	institutions	have	failed	to	wield	the	influence	over	Brexit
that	many	might	have	expected.
The	so-called	‘Chequers’	deal	on	Brexit,	enshrined	in	the	Government’s	White	Paper	in
July	2018,	came	as	a	shock	to	many	within	the	UK	financial	industry.	While	it	pledged	to	secure	a	final	Brexit
agreement	that	retained	privileged	market	access	and	compliance	with	a	common	rulebook	for	goods,	no	such
commitment	was	made	for	services.	In	fact,	the	Chequers	compromise	was	quite	explicit	that	existing	market	access
for	financial	services,	based	on	passporting	rights,	will	not	continue	and	that	the	prospect	of	future	regulatory
divergence	is	a	real	one.
The	dissatisfaction	of	the	main	City	authorities,	which	tend	to	represent	the	views	of	the	largest	London-based	banks,
is	not	difficult	to	explain.	What	is	more	puzzling	is	why	the	City	has	been	so	ineffectual	at	shaping	the	UK
government’s	Brexit	policy,	and	has	been	forced	to	repeatedly	row	back	on	its	lobbying	position?	The	City	is	often
viewed	as	an	all-powerful	force	in	UK	politics.	It’s	easy	to	see	why.	Financial	services	make	up	6.5%	of	the	UK
economy	and	just	over	11%	when	associated	professional	services	are	included.	London	is	the	source	of	more	than
half	of	this,	generating	an	equivalently	large	percentage	of	UK	taxes.	The	problems,	and	especially	the	costs,
unleashed	by	the	2007-08	financial	crisis	served	as	a	reminder	to	how	central	and	disruptive	the	City’s	place	in	the
UK	can	be.
During	the	2016	referendum	campaign,	several	US	investment	banks	with	offices	in	the	City	campaigned	hard	for	a
Remain	vote,	while	UK	‘national	champion’	banks	like	HSBC	pushed	strongly	in	the	aftermath	of	the	vote	for	the	UK
to	retain	membership	of	the	European	Economic	Area	(EEA).	Yet	the	City	authorities	were	forced	to	revise	their
collectively-agreed	position	in	response	to	Prime	Minister	May’s	Lancaster	House	speech	in	January	2017	which
explicitly	ruled	out	single	market	membership.	Instead,	they	advocated	a	‘bespoke	deal’	for	financial	services	based
on	‘mutual	access’	and	‘mutual	recognition’	which	would	allow	UK	firms	to	passport	into	the	EU	in-all-but-name.	The
City	pushed	this	position	throughout	2017,	seemingly	to	no	avail,	until	eventually,	the	Chancellor	Philip	Hammond
acknowledged	in	December	2017	that	this	was	also	the	Government’s	preferred	position.	Yet	this	alignment	in
position	proved	short-lived.	In	the	face	of	intransigent	EU	opposition	to	a	special	deal	for	finance,	the	bespoke
arrangement	was	finally	laid	to	rest	in	Chequers	and	replaced	by	a	‘new	regulatory	arrangement’	for	financial
services	which	retains	autonomy	for	both	UK	and	EU	regulators.	Roughly	translated,	this	is	most	likely	to	entail	a
strengthened	or	‘enhanced’	form	of	the	EU’s	existing	third	country	equivalence	regime	whereby	UK-based	firms	will
be	able	to	access	the	EU	single	market,	provided	that	UK	regulators	can	demonstrate	‘equivalence’	with	EU	rules.	In
practice,	and	as	the	City	has	long	been	at	pains	to	point	out,	this	arrangement	will	impose	new	regulatory	barriers	on
UK	firms	with	EU	subsidiaries	and	provides	a	less	secure	basis	for	trading	in	the	EU.	Hence,	while	the	July	White
Paper	set	out	a	relatively	soft	Brexit	landing	for	manufacturers,	large	parts	of	the	City	are	still	heading	for	a	turbulent
hard	Brexit.
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Intriguingly,	backtracking	by	the	City	on	its	Brexit	position	reverses	the	normal	dynamics	of	regulatory	capture:	rather
than	policymakers	shifting	their	position	in	response	to	industry	lobbying,	it	is	the	City	authorities	that	have	been
forced	to	revise	their	position	in	the	face	of	political	opposition.	Industry	insiders	that	we	have	spoken	to	are	acutely
aware	of	the	extent	to	which	they	have	been	forced	to	‘sing	the	same	tune’	as	the	Government	on	Brexit.	How	can
we	explain	this	apparent	‘reverse	capture’	of	the	City?	We	argue	that	this	is	less	of	a	puzzle	once	we	begin	to
disaggregate	what	the	‘City’	actually	is.	Although	widely	used	as	shorthand	for	the	UK	financial	industry,	in	reality	the
City	of	London	represents	a	loosely-interconnected	network	of	financial	firms	which	together	constitute	what	political
geographers	refer	to	as	an	agglomeration	economy.	In	simpler	terms,	the	City	does	not	constitute	a	coherent	political
or	institutional	entity,	and	less	still	does	it	share	a	common	set	of	preferences	around,	redistributive	policy	issues	like
Brexit.	If	we	consider	the	wider	ecosystem	of	actors	that	make	up	the	City,	the	UK	government’s	position	set	out	in
Chequers	makes	more	sense.	This	is	because	there	are	at	least	two	important	sets	of	actors	pushing	for	a	relatively
hard	Brexit	deal	that	would	leave	the	EU	outside	the	EU	single	market,	opposed	to	full	alignment	with	the	EU’s	Single
Rulebook	on	financial	services,	and	supports	the	possibility	of	regulatory	divergence	in	the	future.
The	first	group	are	composed	primarily	of	non-banking	interests	within	the	City.	Roughly	one-third	of	the	UK	financial
sector	is	broadly	relaxed	about	the	prospect	of	Brexit.	This	figure	comes	from	a	variety	of	sources,	including	the
recent	YouGov	survey	of	Financial	Times	and	City	AM	readers,	a	third	of	whom	professed	their	support	for	leaving
the	EU.	From	a	political	economy	perspective,	this	is	not	difficult	to	explain:	only	around	20%	of	the	City’s	revenue	is
reliant	on	EU	passporting	rights	and	vast	swathes	of	financial	services	are	traded	in	Europe	without	them.	For
example,	the	investment	fund	industry	assumes	that	it	will	be	able	to	delegate	the	management	of	EU-domiciled
funds	back	to	London	after	Brexit.	Similarly,	it	is	possible	for	hedge	funds	and	other	alternative	investment	funds	to
use	national	placement	regimes	to	continue	doing	business	across	the	EU,	as	was	commonplace	a	decade	ago.
Moreover,	some	prominent	voices	view	Brexit	as	an	opportunity	to	roll	back	some	of	the	more	unpopular	post-crisis
measures	to	have	emerged	in	recent	years,	including	the	insurance	regulation,	Solvency	II.
The	second	group	are	financial	regulators.	In	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	2016	referendum,	senior	regulators
made	it	clear	that	they	would	not	support	any	outcome	that	would	leave	them	as	‘rule	takers’	from	Brussels.	Indeed,
the	Bank	of	England	was	quick	to	torpedo	HSBC’s	early	push	for	the	UK	to	seek	EEA	membership.	Their	opposition
to	a	soft	Brexit	is	grounded	in	bureaucratic	politics:	any	such	arrangement	would	inevitably	involve	a	serious
diminution	of	regulatory	power,	status	and	discretion.	Over	time,	the	role	of	UK	regulators	in	shaping	the	UK
government’s	thinking	and	strategy	on	financial	services	has	become	increasingly	important.	It	is	no	coincidence,	for
example,	that	the	July	2018	White	Paper	stresses	that	UK	regulators	must	retain	‘autonomy’,	not	as	a	route	to
potential	deregulation,	but	on	the	contrary,	to	ensure	that	they	can	continue	to	impose	tougher	regulatory	(capital)
requirements	on	UK-based	banks.	This	language	is	a	direct	legacy	of	the	prolonged	battle	that	British	officials	fought
with	the	European	Commission	in	2012-13	over	the	ability	of	national	regulators	to	impose	capital	requirements
above	and	beyond	EU	rules.
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These	two	groups	–	non-banks	and	regulators	–	constitute	a	powerful	‘baptist-bootlegger’	coalition;	that	is,	two	actors
that	have	seemingly	opposing	interests,	but	have	shared	preferences	around	a	specific	policy	issue.	Hence,	the
interests	of	non-banks	and	regulators	diverge	as	many	prominent	voices	within	the	former	favour	regulatory	rollback
post-Brexit,	while	the	latter	are	determined	to	maintain	their	capacity	for	‘goldplating’	EU	and	international	rules.	But
they	are	nonetheless	unified	in	their	preference	for	a	hard	Brexit	outcome	that	provides	scope	for	future	UK-EU
regulatory	divergence	in	financial	services.	These	actors	have	not	sought	to	coordinate	their	lobbying	efforts,	but
together	they	have	proven	to	be	highly	effective	in	shaping	the	UK	government’s	Brexit	strategy.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of		LSE	Brexit	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.	An
earlier	version	of	this	article	appears	in	New	Political	Economy.
Scott	James	is	a	Senior	Lecturer	in	Political	Economy	at	King’s	College	London.
Lucia	Quaglia	is	Professor	at	the	Department	of	Political	and	Social	Sciences,	University	of	Bologna.
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